One way to think about STRIPS is as a mapping from databases to databases, in the following sense: Suppose we want to know what the world would be like if an action, represented by the STRIPS operator , were done in some world, represented by the STRIPS database D 0 . To nd out, simply perform the operator on D 0 (by applying 's elementary add and delete revision operators to D 0 ). We describe this process as progressing the database D 0 in response to the action .
INTRODUCTION
One way to think about STRIPS is as a mapping from databases to databases, in the following sense: Suppose we want to know what the world would be like if an action, represented by the STRIPS operator , were done in some world, represented by the STRIPS database D 0 . To nd out, simply perform the operator on D 0 (by applying 's elementary add and delete revision operators to D 0 ). We describe this process as progressing the database D 0 in response to the action (cf. Rosenschein 24] and Pednault 16] ). The resulting database describes the e ects of the action on the world represented by the initial database. 1 However, it may not always be convenient or even possible to describe the e ects of actions as a simple process of progressing an initial world description. As we shall see in this paper, once we go beyond STRIPS-like systems, progression becomes surprisingly complicated.
In this paper, we consider the general problem of progressing an initial database in response to a given sequence of actions. We appeal to the situation calculus and an axiomatization of actions which addresses the frame problem (Reiter 21 ], Lin and Reiter 13] ). This setting is considerably more general than STRIPS. Our results concerning progression are mixed. The (surprising) bad news is that, in general, to characterize a progressed database we must appeal to second order logic. The good news is that there are many useful special cases for which we can compute the progressed database in rst order logic; not only that, we can do so e ciently.
Finally, we relate these results about progression to STRIPS-like systems by providing a semantics for such systems in terms of a purely declarative situation calculus axiomatization for actions and their e ects. On our view, STRIPS is a mechanism for computing the progression of an initial situation calculus database under the e ects of an action. We illustrate this idea by describing two di erent STRIPS mechanisms, and proving their correctness with respect to their situation calculus speci cations.
The need to progress a database arises for us in a robotics setting. In our approach to controlling a robot ( 8, 10] ), we must address the so-called projection problem: Answer the query Q(do(A; S 0 )), where do(A; S 0 ) denotes the situation resulting from performing the sequence of actions A beginning with the initial situation S 0 . This can be done using regression (cf. Waldinger 27] , Pednault 17] , and Reiter 21] ) to reduce the projection problem to one of entailment from the initial database, consisting of sentences about the initial situation S 0 . Unfortunately, regression su ers from a number of drawbacks in this application:
sisting of all the actions it has performed since the initial situation, has become extremely long, and regressing over such a sequence becomes computationally expensive. 2. Similarly, after a long while, the initial world state often becomes so rearranged that signi cantly many nal steps of the regression become entirely unnecessary. 3. Most signi cantly, for robotics, perceptual actions (Scherl and Levesque 25]) lead to new facts being added to the database. But such facts are true in the current situation { the one immediately following the perceptual action { whereas the other (old) database facts are true in S 0 . Reasoning about databases containing mixed facts { facts about the current and initial situations { is very complicated, and we know of no satisfactory way to do this. Our way of addressing these problems with regression is to to periodically progress the robot's database. In particular, every perceptual action is accompanied by a progression of the database, coupled with the addition of the perceived fact to the resulting database. We envisage that these database progression computations can be done o -line, during the time when the robot is busy performing physical actions, like moving about.
LOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
The language L of the situation calculus is rst-order, many-sorted, with sorts situation for situations, action for actions, and object for everything else. It has the following domain independent predicates and functions: a constant S 0 of sort situation denoting the initial situation; a binary function do(a; s) denoting the situation resulting from performing the action a in the situation s; a binary predicate Poss(a; s) meaning that the action a is possible (executable) in situation s; and a binary predicate <: situation situation. s < s 0 means that s 0 can be reached from s by a sequence of executable actions. We assume a nite number of situation independent predicates with arity object n , n 0, a nite number of situation independent functions with arity object n ! object, n 0, and a nite number of uents which are predicate symbols of arity object n situation, n 0. We denote by L 2 the secondorder extension of L. Our foundational axioms for the situation calculus will be in L 2 (Lin and Reiter 13] ), because we need induction on situations (Reiter 22] ). Often, we must restrict the situation calculus to a particular situation. For example, the initial database is a nite set of sentences in L that do not mention any situation terms except S 0 , and do not mention Poss and <. For this purpose, for any situation term st, we de ne L st to be the subset of L that does not mention any other situation terms except st, does not quantify over situation variables, and does not mention Poss or <. Formally, it is the smallest set satisfying 1. ' 2 L st provided ' 2 L does not mention any situation term. 2. F(t 1 ; :::; t n ; st) 2 L st provided F is a uent of the right arity, and t 1 ; :::; t n are terms of the right sort.
3. If ' and ' 0 are in L st , so are :', ' _ ' 0 , '^' 0 , ' ' 0 , ' ' 0 , (8x)', (9x)', (8a)', and (9a)', where x and a are variables of sort object and action, respectively.
We remark here that according to this de nition, (8a)F(do(a; S 0 )) will be in L do(a;S 0 ) . This may seem odd when we want sentences in L st to be propositions about situation st. Fortunately 2. p(t 1 ; :::; t n ) 2 L 2 st provided p is a predicate variable of arity object n , n 0, and t 1 ; :::; t n are terms of sort object. 3 . If ' and ' 0 are in L 2 st , so are :', ' _ ' 0 , '^' 0 , ' ' 0 , ' ' 0 , (8x)', (9x)', (8a)', (9a)', (8p)', and (9p)', where x and a are variables of sort object and action, respectively, and p is a predicate variable of arity object n , n 0.
BASIC ACTION THEORIES
We assume that our action theory D has the following form (cf. Reiter 23] A(x 1 ; :::; x n ) = A(y 1 ; :::; y n ) x 1 = y 1^ ^x n = y n : D S 0 , the initial database, is a nite set of rst-order sentences in L S 0 .
We shall give an example of our action theory in a moment. First, we brie y explain our foundational axioms since they are independent of particular applications. contains axioms about the structure of situations. Formally, consists of the following set of axioms: S 0 6 = do(a; s); (2) do(a 1 ; s 1 ) = do(a 2 ; s 2 ) (a 1 = a 2^s1 = s 2 ); (3) (8P):P(S 0 )^(8a; s) P(s) P(do(a; s))] (8s)P(s); (4) :s < S 0 ; (5) s < do(a; s 0 ) (Poss(a; s 0 )^s s 0 ):
Notice the similarity between and Peano Arithmetic. The rst two axioms are unique names assumptions; they eliminate nite cycles, and merging. The third axiom is second-order induction; it amounts to a domain closure axiom which says that every situation must be obtained by repeatedly applying do to S 0 . 3 The last two axioms de ne < inductively.
is the only place where axioms about the structure of situations can appear. It is often needed if we want to show, usually by induction, that a state constraint of the form (8s)C(s) is entailed by an action theory. For the purpose of temporal projection, in particular progression as we shall see, D has exactly the same e ect as D ? : For any formula '(s) in L s , and any sequence A of ground action terms,
This follows directly from the following proposition which will be used throughout this paper. To de ne progression, we rst introduce an equivalence relation over structures. Let M and M 0 be structures (for our language) with the same domains for sorts action and object. De This theorem informs us that D S is a strongest post-condition (cf. Pednault 16 ], Dijkstra and Scholten 3], and others) of the pre-condition D S 0 with respect to the action . Pednault 16] shows that his de nition of progression cannot in general be a nite set of rst-order sentences in L S . By Theorem 1, this result applies to our de nition as well. In the next section, we shall extend this result, and show that D S need not even be a set of rst-order sentences in L S .
Progression Is Not Always First-Order De nable
At rst glance, the fact that progression cannot always be expressed in rst-order We now proceed to construct a such basic action theory, and the two associated structures.
Consider the following theory D with a unary uent F 1 , and a binary uent To see the intuitive meaning of the successor state axioms, think of the constant symbol 0 as the number 0, and the unary function succ as the successor function. Then for any x, F 2 (x; do(a; s)) holds if either x = 0 and F 2 (0; s) holds, or F 2 (x; s) and F 2 (predecessor(x); s) happen to have the same truth value. The purpose of F 1 is to keep track of the truth values of F 2 in the previous situation.
We rst construct M 2 which is a structure such that: 1. M 2 is a standard model of arithmetic with respect to sort object. Thus the domain for object in M 2 is the set of nonnegative numbers, 0 is mapped to the number 0, and succ is mapped to the successor function. 
Progression Is Always Second-Order De nable
We now show that, by appealing to second-order logic, progression always exists. We rst introduce some notation. , the lifting of ' on the situation st, written '"st, is the result of replacing every uent atom of the form F(t 1 ; :::; t n ; st) by a new predicate variable p(t 1 ; :::; t n ) of arity object n . For example, enrolled(John; C200; S 0 )^enrolled(John; C100; S 0 )"S 0 is p(John; C200)^p(John; C100). Therefore from (7) and (8) It is clear that the theorem still holds when the initial database D S 0 is a nite set of second-order sentences in L 2 S 0 . Therefore, at least in principle, the theorem can be repeatedly applied to progress the initial database in response to a sequence of actions.
The new database D S as de ned in the theorem can be unwieldy. However, it can often be simpli ed by using the unique names axioms in D una , as we shall see in the following example. If true, this conjecture would establish that a de nition of progression in terms of rst-order entailments would be too weak. However, for an important class of rst-order sentences, this \weaker" de nition of progression is entirely adequate. Speci cally, for addressing the projection problem, rst order progression is su cient. 
PROGRESSION WITH RELATIVELY COM-PLETE INITIAL DATABASES
In the previous section we showed that, in general, progression is de nable only in second-order logic. However, there are some interesting and important special cases for which progression is rst-order de nable. In this section and the next, we consider two such cases.
We say D S 0 is relatively complete (with respect to situation independent propositions) if it is a set of situation independent sentences together with a set of sentences, one for each uent F, of the form: John 6 = Sue 6 = C100 6 = C200; better(70; 50); prereq(C100; C200); enrolled(st; c; do( ; S 0 )) st = Sue^c = C200; grade(st; c; g; do( ; S 0 )) st = Sue^c = C100^g = 70:
PROGRESSION IN THE CONTEXT FREE CASE
In this section we consider progression with respect to context-free action theories. A successor state axiom for F is context free i it has the form:
Poss(a; s) F(x; do(a; s)) + F (x; a) _ (F(x; s)^: ?
F (x; a))]; (12) where + F (x; a) and ? F (x; a) are situation independent formulas whose free variables are among those inx; a. The successor state axioms in our educational database are all context free. So is the following successor state axiom:
Poss(a; s) broken(x; do(a; s)) a = drop(x)^fragile(x) _ broken(x; s)^a 6 = repair(x)]:
The following successor state axiom is not context-free: Poss(a; s) dead(x; do(a; s)) (9y)(a = explode bomb at(y)^close(x; y; s)) _ dead(x; s)]:
Now assume that:
1. D S 0 is a set of situation independent sentences, and sentences of the form E F(x 1 ; : : :; x n ; S 0 ); (13) where E is a situation independent formula. For example, ontable(x; S 0 ); x 6 = A :ontable(x; S 0 ); fragile(x) broken(x; S 0 ); are all of this form. F (x; a); (14) where F's successor state axiom has the form (12 F (x; a)); is logically equivalent to the conjunction of the above four sentences, whenever the consistency condition holds. Notice that the consistency condition makes good sense: If it were violated, so that for someX; A; S we have Poss(A; S), + F (X; A; S), and ? F (X; A; S), then we could derive an immediate inconsistency from the above two e ect axioms.
It is easy to verify that each uent in our educational database satis es the consistency condition.
Under these assumptions, to compute D S , use Theorem 1 to construct a set S, initially empty, of sentences as follows: We construct M 0 as follows:
1. M 0 and M have the same domains for sorts action and object, and interpret all situation independent predicates and functions the same. Notice that by our coherence assumption for D S 0 , our construction is wellde ned. The following remarks are worth noticing:
1. The new database S has the same syntactic form as D S 0 , so this process can be iterated.
2. The computation of S is very e cient, and the size of S is bounded by the sum of the size of D S 0 and twice the number of uents.
We emphasize that the results of this section depend on the fact that the initial database has a certain speci c form. In fact, a result by Pednault 16] shows that for context-free actions and arbitrary D S 0 , progression is not always guaranteed to yield nite rst-order theories.
STRIPS
Ever since STRIPS was rst introduced (Fikes and Nilsson 6]), its logical semantics has been problematic. There have been many proposals in the literature (e.g. Lifschitz 
11], Erol, Nau and Subrahmanian 4], Bacchus and Yang 2])
. These all have in common a reliance on meta-theoretic operations on logical theories to capture the add and delete lists of STRIPS operators, but it has never been clear exactly what these operations correspond to declaratively, especially when they are applied to logically incomplete theories. In the sequel, we shall provide a semantics for STRIPSlike systems in terms of a purely declarative situation calculus axiomatization for actions and their e ects. On our view, STRIPS is a mechanism for computing the progression of an initial situation calculus database under the e ects of an action. We shall illustrate this idea by describing two di erent STRIPS mechanisms, and proving their correctness with respect to their situation calculus speci cations.
Following Lifschitz ( 11] Our semantics for STRIPS systems is indirect; we de ne certain classes of theories in the situation calculus and show how to associate suitable STRIPS systems with those theories. Only STRIPS systems associated with such situation calculus theories will, on our account of STRIPS, be assigned a semantics. This leaves many STRIPS systems (namely those without an associated situation calculus theory) without a semantics; we are not very distressed by this, given that STRIPS systems, in their full generality, do not currently have coherent semantics anyway.
TWO VERSIONS OF STRIPS
The STRIPS systems we derive apply only to a restricted class of situation calculus action theories for which the successor state axioms have a particular syntactic form, which we now de ne. A successor state axiom is strongly context free i it has the form:
Poss(a; s) F(x; do(a; s)) (9ṽ (1) )a = A 1 (~ (1) ) _ _ (9ṽ
)a = B 1 (~ (1) )^ ^:(9w
Here the A's and B's are function symbols of sort action, not necessarily distinct from one another. The~ and~ are sequences of distinct variables which include all of the variables ofx; the remaining variables of the~ and~ are those being existentially quanti ed by theṽ andw, respectively.x could be the empty sequence. Notice that strongly context free successor state axioms are special cases of context free successor state axioms de ned in Section 6. The successor state axioms of our running blocks world example given below are strongly context free. The following successor state axiom is context free but not strongly context free:
Poss(a; s) ontable(x; do(a; s)) a = putontable(x) _ ontable(x; s)^a 6 = tiptable^a 6 = pickup(x)]:
This is because the action tiptable does not have x as a parameter.
The STRIPS systems which we shall characterize will be for languages L 2 whose only function symbols of sort object are constants. Therefore, consider a ground action term , and the strongly context free successor state axiom (19) for uent F, relativized to the initial situation S 0 . How does a ect the truth value of uent F in the successor situation do( ; S 0 )? By the unique names axioms for actions, together with the assumption that the successor state axioms are strongly context free, this relativized axiom will be logically equivalent to a sentence of the form: Poss( ; S 0 ) F(x; do( ; S 0 )) x =X (1) _ _x =X ; do( ; S 0 )), i = 1; : : : ; n. 8 Recall that L 2 is the language in which D is expressed. 4. 's precondition is the situation-suppressed version of the right hand side of the equivalence in 's situation calculus action precondition axiom. 9 See Section 7 for the relevant de nitions. 10 We take it as self evident what is meant formally by the language obtained by suppressing objects of sort situation from the language L 2 .
5. For each uent F, include in 's add and delete lists those literals speci ed above for obtaining the situation suppressed version of S.
To our knowledge, OCF-STRIPS is the only variant of STRIPS which speci cally provides for an incomplete database of ground literals, and which is provably correct with respect to a logical speci cation. be all theC (k) that are di erent tuples than all of theỸ (i) . Then, by unique names axioms for constant symbols of sort object, the above sentence will be logically equivalent to F(x; do( ; S 0 )) x =X (1) _ _x =X (m) _ x =C (1) _ _x =C (r) : (24) Let S be the following set of sentences: 1. Initialize S to f' 2 D S 0 j ' is situation independentg. 2. For each uent F do: Add the sentence (24) to S. The resulting set S enjoys the property that S D una is a progression of D S 0 under action (Theorem 3). Moreover, S has the same syntactic form as D S 0 , and so can serve as a new initial database for the purposes of iterating the above progression mechanism. Now we interpret the above construction of the set S as a STRIPS operator.
Imagine representing the situation dependent sentences F(x; S 0 ) x =C (1) _ _x =C (n) (25) by the situation-suppressed relational database of ground instances F(C (1) ); : : :; F(C (n) ). We emphasize that this representation is merely a shorthand for the sentence (25) . Now ask what sequence of deletions and additions of ground literals must be performed on D 0 , the situation-suppressed relational database version of D S 0 in order to obtain the situation-suppressed relational version of S. The deletions and additions necessary to achieve this transformation of D 0 to the corresponding representation of S will de ne the delete and add lists for the STRIPS operator .
It is easy to see that the following deletions and additions, when applied to D 0 , yield the situation-suppressed, relational database representation of S:
For each uent F do (with reference to (20) _ _x =C (n) where F(C (1) ); : : :; F(C (n) ) are all the ground instances of a uent F in W. 4 . 's precondition is the situation-suppressed version of the right hand side of the equivalence in 's situation calculus action precondition axiom. 
Pednault's ADL
The only prior literature similar to our progression semantics for STRIPS-like systems is by Pednault ( 18] , 16]). Like us, Pednault relates a STRIPS database to the initial situation of a situation calculus axiomatization. But our interpretation of such a database, namely as a situation-suppressed situation calculus theory, distinguishes our approach from Pednault's, in which these databases are rst order structures. So for Pednault, STRIPS is a mapping from rst order structures to rst order structures, where this mapping is de ned by the addition and deletion of tuples applied to the relations of the structure. ADL, Pednault's generalization of STRIPS, is just such a mapping between structures. For us, as for Lifschitz 11] , STRIPS is a mapping from rst order theories to (possibly second order) theories, where this mapping is e ected by add and delete lists of sentences applied to the theory. The problem with the ADL view on STRIPS is that it does not provide a feasible mechanism for applying a STRIPS operator in the case that the database is a logically incomplete theory (e.g. OCF-STRIPS of Section 8.1). For in such a case, every model of this theory must be mapped by an ADL operator into its transformed structure, and it is the set of all such transformed structures which represents the e ect of the ADL operator. When there are in nitely many such models, or even when they are nite in number but plentiful, ADL becomes an unattractive STRIPS mechanism. In contrast, our focus is on STRIPS mechanisms that operate on logical theories, and hence operate on the single sentential representations of these many models.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE PROBLEMS
Although progression is a widespread notion in the database and AI literatures, in its full generality it is a surprisingly complex idea. This paper has explored some of the properties of progression, and related them to STRIPS systems. Here we summarize what we take to be the main contributions of the paper. arbitrary nite rst order theory, progression need not be nitely rst-order axiomatizable. 4. On our view STRIPS is a mechanism for progressing a situation calculus theory, and its semantics can best be understood with reference to a suitable situation calculus axiomatization of actions and their e ects. Under this intuition, it becomes possible to formulate various STRIPS-like systems, and prove their correctness with respect to our progression semantics. In this paper we have done just that for two di erent STRIPS systems (OCF and RCF-STRIPS). In this connection OCF-STRIPS is of particular interest because it provides for a (limited) form of logical incompleteness of the database. To our knowledge, OCF-STRIPS is the only variant of STRIPS which speci cally provides for an incomplete database of ground literals, and which is provably correct with respect to a logical speci cation. 5. It is a completely mechanical process to obtain the OCF-STRIPS operators from the action precondition and successor state axioms of a situation calculus axiomatization of some domain. Similarly for RCF-STRIPS. In other words, these purely declarative situation calculus speci cations can be compiled into appropriate STRIPS systems. Moreover, Reiter's 21] solution to the frame problem provides an algorithm for computing the successor state axioms from the e ect axioms specifying the causal laws of the domain being modeled. In other words, the axiomatizer can describe the action precondition axioms, and the domain's causal laws. and have those axioms automatically transformed into suitable STRIPS operators for that domain (assuming the successor state axioms and the initial situation have the right syntactic forms).
The results of this paper suggests a variety of topics for future research: 1. There are other cases for which progression can be done in rst order logic. One such case concerns actions with nitary e ects, namely, when for every uent, the action changes the uent's truth value at only a nite number of instances. This and other special cases of progression need to be explored. In this connection, Etzioni et al 5] have recently proposed an extension of STRIPS to accommodate sensing actions, i.e. actions that obtain (at plan execution time) information about the world. As Levesque 9] has observed, the resulting planner su ers from a number of limitations and drawbacks, stemming primarily from the lack of a declarative speci cation of their system. As it happens, a situation calculus account of sensing actions already exists (Scherl and Levesque 25] ). Accordingly, it should be possible to incorporate sensing actions into our notion of progression, and use this to generalize STRIPS to include such actions. It should then be possible to prove the correctness of this version of STRIPS with respect to its progression semantics, much as we did in this paper for RCF-and OCF-STRIPS. 2. We have considered only systems that compute the full result of progression.
Sometimes, for example for computational purposes, it may be better to compute only that part of the progression that is relevant to the goals of interest. For example, if our blocks world includes a uent for the colors of blocks, then there are no need to progress this uent if our goals have nothing to do with colors. It is still an open problem how such partial progressions can be speci ed and computed in a principled way. 3. The connection of RCF-STRIPS to relational databases (Section 8.2) suggests a natural generalization of STRIPS operators to allow for arbitrary relational algebra operators (not just adds and deletes) in de ning the operator's e ects. This can indeed be done, and an appropriate semantics de ned in terms of a situation calculus axiomatization that relaxes the context free restriction on successor state axioms of Section 8.2. In this connection, Pednault's ADL 18] provides for just such a generalized relational STRIPS, but without the relational algebra. 4. In a sense, progressing a database to S amounts to forgetting about the initial situation and all those situations that are reachable from S 0 but not from S . This view of progression leads to an interesting notion of what it means for a knowledge base to forget about some of its contents that is investigated further in (Lin and Reiter 15] ).
